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Summary  
The climate crisis is having a significant detrimental influence on livelihoods in developing countries. 
Climate variability and extremes can negatively impact climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture 
and livestock which are a considerable source of employment and a key contributor to economic 
growth in developing countries (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015; Dell, Jones, and Olken 2014; 2012). 
The intensification of the climate crisis poses a threat to efforts aimed to eliminate poverty and food 
security which, in turn, can threaten peace (United Nations 2020). Despite not being the main or the 
only cause, there is growing evidence of the importance of food insecurity in sparking and sustaining 
civil and communal conflicts (FAO 2016).  
Latin America and the Caribbean is particularly vulnerable to extreme weather events and climate 
variability as it is not only highly exposed to both slow and rapid onset events but also has a low coping 
capacity and a considerable dependence on climate-sensitive sectors (Abdenur, Kuele and Amorim 
2019). LAC is also considered one of the most violence-affected regions in the world with presence of 
different types of conflicts that undermine efforts to eliminate poverty and food insecurity while also 
undermining capacity of states, communities and individuals to cope with the effects of the climate 
crisis. 
Venezuela and Colombia are two paradigmatic examples of countries that suffer from different types 
of violence and insecurity while also being highly exposed and vulnerable to climate variability and 
extremes. Venezuela is undergoing one of the worst humanitarian and migrant crisis in the world. 
More than 5 million Venezuelans have fled to other countries in LAC while 9 million people remain 
food insecure in the country. Colombia is a key actor that bridges South America with Central America 
whose location is highly relevant for human mobility and migration routes along the American 
continent, including the recent influx of 1.7 million Venezuelan migrants. Both countries are 
particularly vulnerable to the climate crisis which is likely to adversely impact land, water, and food 
systems, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities as well as the overall instability and insecurity. 
Using Impact Pathway Analysis, we attempted to identify, describe, and represent complex and non-
linear interactions between climate, conflict, and existing vulnerabilities and risks that are present in 
both countries. By doing so we aim to inform academics, practitioners, donors, investors, national and 
international policymakers about a complicated and heterogeneous reality, to help develop more 
tailored responses targeting regions and communities most at risk. We conclude the paper 
highlighting some key messages and potential entry points, including the potential of CGIAR 
contributions on land, water, and food systems to address conflict and security risks through evidence-
based environmental, political, and socio-economic solutions.  
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1. Climate Security in LAC  
The climate crisis is having a significant detrimental influence on livelihoods in developing countries. 
Climate variability and extremes can negatively impact climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture 
and livestock which are a considerable source of employment and a key contributor to economic 
growth in developing countries (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015; Dell, Jones, and Olken 2014; 2012). 
The intensification of the climate crisis poses a threat to efforts aimed to eliminate poverty and food 
security which, in turn, can threaten peace (United Nations 2020). Despite not being the main or the 
only cause, there is growing evidence of the importance of food insecurity in sparking and sustaining 
civil and communal conflicts (FAO 2016). Food price increases, which often push many vulnerable 
households into food insecurity, have been empirically associated with social unrest and can act as a 
catalyst for instability and even conflict when interacting with local socio-economic and political 
vulnerabilities. 
Some regions of the world are also particularly prone to extreme weather events and climate 
variability. This is the case of LAC, a highly diverse region with a wide range of ecosystems that is 
considerably vulnerable to the changing climate (Abdenur, Institute and Rüttinger 2020; Brácena et 
al. 2016; Abdenur, Kuele and Amorim 2019). LAC is not only highly exposed to climate variability and 
extremes but it also has a low coping capacity and a considerable dependence on climate-sensitive 
sectors (Abdenur, Kuele and Amorim 2019). 
While most of the countries in LAC suffered from civil wars and armed insurgencies in the second half 
of the 20th century, nowadays the type of violence present in region is mainly characterised by 
organized crime and high rates of state violence (Abdenur, Institute and Rüttinger, 2020). Despite not 
having many remaining full-fledged armed conflicts, the region suffers from high homicide rates. Some 
countries in LAC such as Honduras, Nicaragua, or Venezuela are ranked at the bottom of the Global 
Peace Index despite not being at war (Institute of Economics & Peace 2021). Additionally, the region 
has also witnessed various conflicts over natural resources (Ross, 2013; Abdenur, Institute and 
Rüttinger, 2020). In particular, issues revolving around the access and use of land have been present 
for decades and have been at the heart of several conflicts and post-conflict situations including 
Colombia and El Salvador. 
 
2. Impact Pathway Analysis for LAC: Venezuela and Colombia 
2.1. Objective and research questions 
The Impact Pathway Analysis (IPA) aims to identify, describe, and represent the complex and non-
linear interactions between climate, conflict, and existing vulnerabilities and risks with a special focus 
on food, land, and water systems. In particular, the IPA intends to address the following questions: 
• What are the potential climate security pathways through which climate may act as a threat 
multiplier? 
• Which specific vulnerabilities and risks, that are at the heart of insecurity and conflict, may be 
exacerbated by the climate crisis? 
• How can dimensions such as natural resources, livelihoods, mobility, governance and food, 





2.2. Methods and data 
The IPA follows a systematic literature search and review to find, collate, analyse and synthesize 
insights from relevant knowledge products, including reports, policy briefs, fact sheets from grey 
literature, as well as books, journal articles, and other sources of documented evidence in academic 
literature and public media. The construction of a narrative is then followed by consultation with a 
designated set of experts and stakeholders through interviews and written feedback to gather 
evaluation and incorporate suggested revisions. 
 
2.3. Justification 
The idea that climate change can exacerbate existing social, economic, political and environmental 
vulnerabilities and have an impact on security was first recognised by the UN Security Council in its 
2009 report “Climate change and its possible security implications”. The UN Security Council 
acknowledged that climate change can act as a “threat multiplier”, aggravating certain stresses, 
vulnerabilities, and risks that are often at the heart of conflicts and have a direct impact on national 
and human security such as poverty, weak institutions, inadequate access to information or 
resources and high unemployment (UN Secretary-General 2009). However, there is still a lack of 
evidence and consensus on the causal pathways and mechanisms through which climate can impact 
socio-economic and political elements such as state capacity, migration, or food systems. It is 
therefore primordial to look at context-specific cases to try to unveil the geographical hotspots and 
causal pathways through which climate change and variability may contribute to conflict. This effort 
is essential in order to inform academics, practitioners, donors, investors, national and international 
policymakers about a complicated and heterogeneous reality and help them to develop more 
tailored responses that target those regions and communities most at risk and in need of urgent 
help. 
Colombia is a highly diverse country with a large range of ecosystems and considerable biodiversity 
that plays a vital role in combating climate change (The World Bank Group 2021). Its geographical 
location makes Colombia a unique location that bridges South America with Central America, 
connecting the Central American Dry Corridor with the Andes and the Amazonas. This particular 
location makes has important implications for human mobility and migration routes along the 
American continent that are becoming increasingly important due to increasing instability as well as 
the aggravation of the climate crisis. Colombia is also highly dependent on climate-sensitive sectors 
such as agriculture, livestock, fisheries, mining, and tourism which makes it particularly vulnerable to 
the climate crisis, especially considering the wide array of socio-economic and political vulnerabilities 
that it suffers, including the most unequal land distribution in Latin America and the recent influx of 
1.7 million Venezuelan migrants (Guereña 2016; WFP 2020).  
The current humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, triggered by a disputed presidency and collapse of the 
oil-based economy, has left more than 5 million Venezuelans fleeing to other LAC countries due to 
threats of violence and insecurities related to food, health, and essential services (Collins 2019, 
Corrales 2019, Abdenur and Rüttinger 2020). The exposure and vulnerability to climate variability and 
extremes has the potential to aggravate insecurity and migration dynamics. The country’s relatively 
lower overall vulnerability score in ND-GAIN index is accompanied by low readiness, which can then 
compound fragility, especially in sectors like food and health (University of Notre Dame 2019). 
Venezuela has experienced severe and persistent drought over the last decade, along with flooding, 
increasing rainfall variability and accelerated loss and retreat of glaciers in the Venezuelan Andes due 
to warming (Chemnick 2019, Braun and Bezada 2013). Projected climate impacts are predicted to 
impact crop suitability and production, threatening an already alarming crisis that has left around 9 
million people food insecure (Congressional Research Service 2021; World Bank 2021).  
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3. How does climate exacerbate root causes of conflict in Venezuela and 
Colombia? 
These impacts of the climate crisis on existing socio-economic, political, and environmental 
vulnerabilities could exacerbate existing risks and tensions and contribute to instability and insecurity 
in Venezuela and Colombia through multiple pathways. 
3.1. Venezuela 
The current humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has been triggered by a disputed presidency and collapse 
of the oil-based economy. With more than 5 million Venezuelans fleeing to other LAC countries due 
to threats of violence and insecurities related to food, health, and essential services, this urgently calls 
for adopting a climate security lens (Collins 2019, Corrales 2019, Abdenur and Rüttinger 2020). This 
lens can be used to examine potential pathways of Venezuela’s climate security nexus (Figure 1) where 
climate may act as a “threat multiplier” exacerbating conditions of insecurity and fragility, through 
complex interactions with environmental, socio-economic, and political factors.  
As home to 6% of the Amazon rainforest, one of the most crucial carbon sinks in the world, Venezuela’s 
humanitarian crisis and political economic instability could arguably have a devastating environmental 
footprint (Burelli 2021). Adverse effect of activities like resource extraction and mining on the 
environment can translate to harmful consequences for lives and livelihoods dependent on natural 
resources like trees, water, and fish. Loss and damage to this precious ecological reservoir from 
deforestation and forest degradation could cast a long shadow over climatic conditions of the region, 
with harmful feedback effects through carbon emissions (Pacheco-Angulo et al 2017).  
Venezuela’s weak environmental institutions, augmented by the restructuring and transition of the 
Ministry of Environment into the Ministry of Ecosocialism under the Maduro regime, have not been 
able to address and regulate deforestation caused by illicit logging activities. Illegal logging has 
become a source of firewood and alternative livelihood for many in the country, and a source of profit 
for corrupt officials, leading to further neglect of environmental laws and institutions (Burelli 2021). 
While on the one hand there is lack of effective implementation of environmental policies, on the 
other, communities dependent on natural resources for their livelihood and culture tend to be held 
responsible for the loss of forests. For instance, traditional fire use and management practices for 
subsistence activities by indigenous communities like the Pemón in Canaima National Park area have 
been misunderstood as the leading cause of forest loss. This has resulted in conflict between the 
Pemón people and government agencies, with the latter adopting a conservation strategy like fire 
exclusion (Bilbao et al 2010).  
Although the country’s vulnerability to flooding and rainfall variability is well-documented, Venezuela 
has also experienced a severe and persistent drought over the last decade, along with accelerated loss 
and retreat of glaciers in the Venezuelan Andes due to warming (Chemnick 2019, Braun and Bezada 
2013). Effect and frequency of droughts have been linked to ENSO events, with serious consequences 
like loss of mangroves along the Caribbean coast of Venezuela (Barreto 2008). Further, projected 
retreat of the last remaining Humboldt glacier comes with dire implications for downstream ecology 
and water cycle in glacier-fed river basins (World Bank 2021).  
The country’s relatively lower overall vulnerability score in ND-GAIN index is accompanied by low 
readiness, which can then compound fragility, especially in sectors like food and health (University of 
Notre Dame 2019). A recent estimate by the World Food Program (WFP) finds around 9 million 
Venezuelans to be facing food insecurity (Congressional Research Service 2021). Projected climate 
impacts on agriculture, livestock, and fisheries are predicted to threaten food security, with factors 
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like rainfall extremes, increasing temperatures, flood, drought, and heat stress adversely affecting 
crop suitability and production (World Bank 2021). While prior to the pandemic, the country was 
witnessing protests due to grievances against the government’s inability to deliver basic services, 
criticisms of the government’s inadequate COVID-19 response have been met with arrests and human 
rights violations of migrant workers, healthcare workers, and humanitarian actors (Harrison and 
Kristensen 2021). 
Pathway #1: Livelihood insecurity, environmental degradation, and weak state capacity pathway  
This pathway describes the overall countrywide crisis, with specific focus on some parts of the country. 
Although the role played by the recent drought and rainfall anomalies in amplifying the ongoing 
economic and political crisis in Venezuela needs more scrutiny, the subsequent shortages and 
rationing of water and electricity due to heavy reliance on hydropower affected agricultural sector, 
and exacerbated social tensions, revealing inadequate capacity of the state to respond to drought 
(Chemnick 2019, Abdenur and Rüttinger 2020). 
More than 70% of Venezuela’s rural population lives in poverty, with small-holder farmers largely 
dependent on rain-fed agriculture. This makes their livelihoods vulnerable to impacts of climate 
variability (World Bank 2009). With the discovery of vast oil reserves, contribution of agriculture to 
the economy was reduced. This was further reflected in weak agricultural policies of the government, 
along with collapse of agricultural credit institutions, which, together with rising costs of inputs left 
farmers without adequate support and incentive (World Bank 2009). Inability of the state to meet 
needs of farmers as the only farm supplier via the nationalized Agropatria further weakened the 
agricultural sector, crippling agrarian economy of states like Portuguesa, the country’s breadbasket 
(Watson 2017). While private companies provide agricultural insurance, lack of government support 
for agricultural credit and insurance markets can compound effects of climate related risks. Decline in 
agricultural production and agribusinesses can be further connected to rise in food imports and the 
phenomenon of rural-urban migration (Watters 2021). Destruction of market mechanism through 
expropriation of millions of hectares of agricultural lands, and industrial plants for coffee, dairy, 
cement, steel, as well as banks, along with foreign exchange shortage and debt accumulation have 
reportedly contributed to the government’s inability to address insecurities around water, health, and 
electricity (Walsh 2019). 
Worsening livelihood and food insecurity due to adverse impact of climate on agriculture, as well as 
the vacuum left by lack of state support and weak institutional capacity, can contribute to risks of 
tensions and political unrest. Decreasing annual rainfall over the last decade can be linked with 
growing water and energy insecurity, as Venezuela is heavily dependent on hydropower (Chemnick 
2019). With drier winters and lower water availability affecting productivity of the Guri Dam, rationing 
of water and electricity by the state has led to widespread power outages in Caracas and other areas. 
These shortages augmented the economic meltdown, further impacting agricultural sector and 
climate-sensitive livelihoods through water scarcity (Chemnick 2019). Weak coping capacity to 
respond to energy shortages, despite having been an oil-rich “petro-state” (Walsh 2019), can seriously 
undermine Venezuela’s path to recovery from the ongoing crisis.  
Furthermore, environmental degradation due to resource extraction in fragile ecosystems can have 
severe ramifications like biodiversity loss and contamination of water and food, fueling grievances of 
local communities. Lake Maracaibo, an estuarine lake in northwestern Venezuela, has been a site of 
thousands of oil spills over the last decade. Between 2010 and 2016, more than 46,000 spills have 
been traced to the state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) (Paúl 2021). With continuous 
leakages from oil wells severely affecting the lake’s ecosystem, the surface is said to resemble a 
“permanent black tide.” Pollution of the lake is adversely impacting local fishing communities, through 
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smaller catches, contaminated fish, skin disease, and equipment damage (Paúl 2021). Efforts for 
conservation have not been effective under the Maduro regime (Burelli 2021). This situation can 
escalate a vicious cycle of livelihood and food insecurity, especially in light of the economic meltdown, 
decline in oil prices, hyperinflation, corruption, and failing capacity of the state to ensure human 
security for all. This can then have serious implications for climate related security risks in a country 
becoming increasingly reliant on foreign aid while dealing with sanctions, a situation worsened by the 
COVID-19 pandemic and lack of trust in the government (Congressional Research Service 2021). 
Pathway #2: Resource extraction and competition pathway in Southern Venezuela 
While more attention has been usually given to the northern part of the country because of its vast 
oil reserves, this pathway focuses on southern Venezuela, specifically the mineral-rich region south of 
the Orinoco River (Burelli 2020). Prompted by the collapse of the oil-based economy and the claim of 
having the second largest gold reserves in the world, the Maduro regime decreed this area as the 
“Orinoco Mining Arc” in 2016, thereby opening up this biodiversity rich Amazonian region to 
extraction of minerals (including gold, diamonds, coltan, and rare earth metals such as uranium, nickel, 
and titanium) (Ebus 2019a, Burelli 2020). This policy has resulted in increasing environmental 
degradation through deforestation, sedimentation, mercury poisoning of rivers, and desertification of 
vast areas of Amazon, along with spread of diseases such as malaria. Sediments from mines can be 
further damaging to existing infrastructure, such as hydropower turbines at the Guri dam, the 
hydropower facility that serves as a major source of electricity for the country (Burelli 2020). 
This large-scale environmental destruction can be linked to the ongoing crisis in the region, involving 
massive human rights violations, lawlessness, and loss of sovereignty over a vast swath of the territory 
(Ebus 2019a). Mining in the region, a key source of revenue for the Maduro regime, has become a 
fertile ground for organized crime and a parallel economy based on gold, with involvement of both 
state and non-state actors, including the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents who operate in the region by embedding themselves in the local 
community, and through volatile alliance with the state military who profit from the mining (Ebus 
2019a, Ebus 2019b, Burelli 2020).  
Insecurity risks in the region are largely related to the countrywide economic collapse and 
hyperinflation, and associated decline in employment and income, which then drive local communities 
to move to this area in search of alternative livelihoods. They then mainly get involved in illegal mining 
and criminal activities, with the likelihood to join non-state armed groups for survival. Uncontrolled 
resource extraction in lands that traditionally belonged to indigenous groups can be connected to 
forced displacement of populations, and related dismantling of indigenous social structures. This can 
then lead to further compounding of risks of violence for local people in the south, already suffering 
from epidemic and food shortages, through prevalence of channels for human trafficking, slave labor 
and child labor (Burelli 2020). Violent clashes between armed groups are a regular feature in these 
parts, with local crime syndicates, called sindicatos engaging in violent clashes with the Colombian 
guerrilla groups and army over the control of mines (Ebus 2019a).  
Furthermore, with revenues from resource extraction serving as capital for corrupt political elites, 
revenues through taxes become undervalued, thereby widening the rupture between the government 
and local people in this region (Ebus 2019a). Therefore, in the absence of good governance and lack 
of effective institutions for conflict resolution, impact of climate variability would be likely to 
exacerbate risks of violence and insecurity. 
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Pathway #3: Transboundary dynamics pathway  
The economic meltdown brought on by declining oil prices, hyperinflation, and lack of access to public 
goods and services including water, electricity, and healthcare, together with the political turmoil 
around the disputed presidency, have created a humanitarian crisis, resulting in mass exodus of over 
5 million Venezuelans fleeing this repressive regime, and moving to other Latin American countries 
(Chemnick 2019, Abdenur and Rüttinger 2020, Human Rights Watch 2021). Officials under the Maduro 
regime have been indicted by the US for engaging in narcotrafficking, corruption, and human rights 
abuses, reportedly deriving their income from the inflow of currency through drug trafficking. While 
foreign interventions through oil sanctions hurt the legitimate economy, criminal accomplices of the 
regime are said to benefit from extortion of remittances sent by Venezuelan migrants across the 
international border (Ellis 2020).  
Many of these migrants are crossing the border to neighboring Colombia. For example, in oil producing 
Zulia state in north-western Venezuela, people are escaping to the Colombian side of the border, 
driven by hunger, poverty, violence, and inflated costs of basic services. However, instead of finding 
sanctuary on the other side of the border, distressed migrants (many with serious health conditions) 
struggle to survive without adequate food, water, and basic services like healthcare (Ebus 2020).  
The influx of these refugees may put a strain on resources in the receiving areas, and possibly 
contribute to tensions with the host community. Without adequate livelihood support, refugees can 
become even more vulnerable to insecurity risks by finding employment through organized crime 
channels that flourish in the border area due to absence of cooperation by security forces. 
Additionally, there have been reports of sexual and gender-based violence at border checkpoints 
(Ebus 2020). Furthermore, risks of violence confronting migrants, refugees, and residents in the 
borderland area can come from violent clashes between the indigenous Wayuu community and 
narcos and guerrillas wanting to control the border (Ebus 2020).  
COVID-19 further compounded precarity of the migrants, heightening their exposure to the virus in 
the context of lack of access to water, sanitation, and shelter. Xenophobic sentiments against 
displaced Venezuelans, especially those evicted and homeless, can magnify their exposure to 
insecurity and violence, with women forming a significant proportion of this group, and youth not in 
education system at the risk of being recruited by criminal organizations and armed groups (UNHCR 
2021). Such situations can then lead to the possibility of COVID-induced return of migrants from 
neighboring countries, with associated risks of contagion from being detained for “quarantine” under 





Figure 1: Climate Security Pathways for Venezuela 
 
3.2. Colombia 
Colombia is a highly diverse country with a large range of ecosystems and considerable biodiversity1 
and water resources (The World Bank Group 2021). The country is highly vulnerable to climate change 
and variability, frequently suffering from extreme weather events such as droughts and floods. 
Temperatures are projected to continue rising between 2 and 4°C for the period to 2041/2070, 
potentially impacting water and land resources. Small-scale farmers are especially vulnerable because 
of their high dependency on rain-fed agriculture and their limited adapting capacity (The World Bank 
Group 2021; Colombian Government 2010). Rainfall variability is also likely to increase with a 
significant regional disparity –more rainfall in the Amazon basin and the coastal areas, and less rainfall 
in the highlands (The World Bank Group 2021). These changes in climate are likely to severely impact 
Colombia’s economy and society which is notably dependent on climate-sensitive sectors such as 
agriculture, livestock, fisheries, mining, and tourism. Climate variability will particularly affect rural 
population and contribute to migration and internal displacement as well as hinder poverty reduction 
strategies, increasing the vulnerability of the most marginalised populations (PNUD 2011). 
At the same time Colombia suffers from many vulnerabilities, inequalities, and risks, some of which 
are both a cause and a consequence of the ongoing armed conflict. Unequal access to land has been 
 
1 Colombia is considered the second most biodiverse country in the world after Brazil. 
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at the heart of the conflict, including the preceding era of La Violencia, the civil unrest and the 
emergence of armed groups. The post-colonial governments continued with the Spanish legacy of high 
concentration of land and extended practices of land dispossession through violent means that 
severely undermined the livelihood of rural citizens (Pons-Vignon and Solignac Lecomte 2004; 
Thomson 2011). In fact, Colombia has the most unequal land distribution in Latin America with more 
than two thirds of the agricultural land concentrated in only 0,4% of the farmland holdings. In contrast, 
84% of smallholder farmers controlled just 4% of the land (Guereña 2016). 
To counter the growing influence of the guerrilla groups and strengthen their power, big landowners 
created paramilitary self-defense groups which continued evicting farmers from their lands, taking 
advantage of the widespread absence of formal land titles which facilitated the expulsion of farmers 
from their lands (Guereña 2016). This dynamic, which continued throughout the 20th and 21st 
centuries, has recently been progressively linked to the expansion of the agribusiness and mining 
industry (Guereña 2016). Likewise, the growing violence, the eviction of farmers from their and the 
increasing presence of paramilitary groups has been also linked to the drug trade which boosted in 
the 1980s. In fact, drug cartels and paramilitary groups invested a considerable amount of their profits 
in acquiring land, using it for livestock and oil palm plantations. These groups currently own around 5 
million hectares of land which accounts for 15% of Colombia’s territory (Guereña 2016). Land 
acquisition has been the easiest way of money laundering as the land is a low taxed asset that can be 
easily purchased with a scarce government surveillance (USAID 2013; IDEAM et al. 2017). The land 
accumulation process shows how land in Colombia has been often regarded as a wealth accumulation 
mechanism rather than a productive mean to produce value (IDEAM et al. 2017). Such incredibly high 
concentration of land has been found to be detrimental for economic growth as well as a driving force 
for deforestation and a root cause of climate change (Lema and Kleffmann, 2019). Likewise, the use 
of land in Colombia shows an important imbalance between agriculture and livestock. The number of 
hectares devoted to livestock, which is generally characterised by a low productivity, has increased at 
the expense of agricultural land and forests. This evinces the excessive use of land for the livestock 
industry and the underused potential of the agricultural sector that uses only 24% of the farmland 
(IDEAM et al. 2017). 
Despite considerable progress in the last two decades, Colombia still has a 35.7% national poverty rate 
while also having a 52% food insecurity rate that has increased last year following the loss of 
employment and income caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (WFP 2020; World Bank 2021). The long-
lasting armed conflict, the arrival of 1.7 million Venezuelan migrants as well as the occurrence of 
extreme weather events have adversely impacted livelihoods and undermined food security (WFP 
2020). In total, the armed conflict in Colombia has led to the internal displacement of more than 8 
million people, curtailing their resilience and the capacity to cope with the effects of the climate crisis  
(ACNUR 2011; Contreras and Contreras 2016). The conflict has also had severe consequences for the 
environment. Actions taken by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) such as illegal mining and 
deforestation, the contamination of aqueducts and the explosion of oil pipelines have severely 
damaged ecosystems (Gutiérrez, Canal, and Ávila 2018). 
In this context, there are multiple pathways through which the climate crisis could act as a threat 
multiplier in Colombia, exacerbating pre-existing socio-economic, political and environmental 
vulnerabilities that are at the heart of conflict and security risks (Figure 2). 
Pathway #1: Water availability, livelihood insecurity and conflict in La Guajira 
La Guajira is a department of the Caribe region located in the northeast of Colombia, near the border 
with Venezuela. La Guajira is the most arid region in Colombia with less than 500mm annual rainfall 
and one of the most affected by the climate crisis (IDEAM et al. 2017; AREMCA and Corpoguajira 2018). 
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It suffers from extreme events such as droughts, floods and hurricanes as well as La Niña and El Niño 
phenomena (ELC La Guajira 2020; AREMCA and Corpoguajira 2018). The existing conditions 
characterised by high levels of desertification and salinisation complicate agriculture and livestock 
activities. Only 2% of the land is considered suitable for agriculture and 2% suitable for livestock, 
compared to the average national levels -19 and 13% respectively (Bonet-Morón and Hahn-De-Castro 
2017). During the last three decades there has been a rise of 0.7°C in average temperatures as well as 
an increase in rainfall variability (AREMCA and Corpoguajira 2018). This trend is likely to continue in 
the future with increases in average temperatures between 0.95 and 0.15% by 2040 and of 2.3°C by 
the end of the century as well as a decline in annual rainfall between 14 and 16% by 2040 (IDEAM et 
al. 2015; AREMCA and Corpoguajira 2018). Without the adequate mitigation and adaptation actions, 
these changes in climate may exacerbate existing socio-economic and political vulnerabilities, and 
potentially lead to an increase in tensions and conflict. 
The department suffers from a series of socio-economic and political vulnerabilities, including its 
economic isolation from the rest of the country as well as the prevalence of rural and highly disperse 
population which increases the difficulties and costs of public service provision (Bonet-Morón and 
Hahn-De-Castro 2017). Despite not being the most important region of drug trafficking in Colombia, 
its coastal territory has been used by many mafias and armed groups for exporting drugs and 
importing weapons and chemical supplies (Trejos Rosero 2017). The territory has suffered from the 
violence exerted by paramilitary groups - Clan del Golfo and Los Pachenca- and guerrillas –ELN and 
FARC-EP- as well as organised crime but also intra-communal violence (Trejos Rosero 2017; PNUD 
2019).  
La Guajira, which shares a border with Venezuela, has been heavily affected by the humanitarian crisis 
that the neighboring country suffers since 2015 and it currently hosts around 150,000 Venezuelan 
migrants (GIFMM La Guajira 2020). The region has strong commercial ties with bordering Venezuelan 
regions -including fuel contraband-, reason why it has suffered the consequences of Venezuela’s 
economic and political crisis (Bonet-Morón, Riccuulli-Marín, and Peña 2021; Ebus 2020). For instance, 
there has been a steep decline in remittances coming from Venezuela which has severely affected 
people’s income as well as the department’s tax collection (Bonet-Morón and Hahn-De-Castro 2017). 
Corruption is also a core problem that has hindered efforts to address some of the existing 
vulnerabilities, reason why the national government decided to intervene in the provision of public 
services such as education, healthcare and water management in 2017 (Bonet-Morón and Hahn-De-
Castro 2017; HRW 2020). 
La Guajira is the department with the highest poverty rate (66.3%) and one of the highest food 
insecurity rates (59.1%) in Colombia (DANE 2021; WFP and ICBF 2008). The vulnerability of the children 
is particularly alarming with 27,9% of the children suffering from chronic malnutrition as well as 
significant rates of stunted growth, anemia and protein deficiency (AREMCA and Corpoguajira 2018; 
WFP and ICBF 2008). Despite the overall reduction in the last five years in the infant mortality rate of 
Colombia, La Guajira has witnessed an increase, being the department with the highest infant 
mortality rate and representing 17% of the national cases (ELC La Guajira 2020). These socio-economic 
vulnerabilities affect particularly the Wayúu, an ethnic group that represents 38,4% of the region's 
population, has been historically marginalised and is particularly vulnerable (ELC La Guajira 2020; HRW 
2020; Villalba Hernández 2007). 
The ECLAC has identified the potential of conflict over the different water uses, including irrigation, 
safe water supply and mining. While mining sectors are essential for many Latin American economies, 
mining operations require considerable water resources and are also often linked to water pollution 
which can endanger water resources and lead to conflicts between different water uses (Martín and 
11 
 
Justo 2015). In the case of La Guajira we can see that the relevance of the agriculture and livestock 
industry has declined in the past few years while the lands that are best suited for agriculture have 
been devoted to mining while the local population continued to suffer from food insecurity and 
malnutrition (AREMCA and Corpoguajira 2018). Lack of access to clean water is a crucial aspect of food 
insecurity in La Guajira which already suffers from an overall lack of hydric resources (AREMCA and 
Corpoguajira 2018). The Constitutional Court of Colombia concluded that mining activities in La 
Guajira have degraded water quality and hindered the access of some indigenous communities to this 
essential resource (Corte Constitucional de Colombia 2015; 2019). 
La Guajira has witnessed conflicts over the access and use of water resources between indigenous and 
civil society organisations and mining companies. The most notorious and controversial involves the 
large open-pit coal mining project of Cerrejón2 that operates in the region since 1976 (Dupre-Harbord 
2017). There have been claims that the mine has curtailed water resources while also polluting the 
remaining ones (Dupre-Harbord 2017). As a consequence, the access to water of the communities for 
drinking and household needs as well as for agriculture and livestock activities has been undermined 
(Corte Constitucional de Colombia 2015) . In recent years the conflict over water resources has been 
exacerbated because of the repeated drought episodes that have render the population even more 
vulnerable, reducing water availability and increasing food insecurity and malnutrition in the region 
(FAO 2019; Dupre-Harbord 2017). Projected increases in temperatures and declines in precipitations 
could exacerbate the problem over the access to water resources, further impacting livelihoods of 
vulnerable communities and potentially increase tensions between indigenous communities and 
mining companies. 
The Colombian president has recently restated the commitment to decarbonisation by 2050 as part 
of the global effort to fight climate change (EFE 2021). The renewable energy transition will lead to an 
increasing importance of low-carbon energy and La Guajira has a great potential for wind and solar 
energy production (El Tiempo 2017). However, it must make sure that this transition is made in a 
climate security sensitive way. The investment of Enel Green Power for building a wind park that 
rekindled the conflict between two clans that had been fighting for more than a decade over land 
disputes in the village of Puerto Lopez is an example of a non-conflict sensitive climate action. The 
company negotiated with just one of the clan leaders without considering the other group which 
created resentment and renewed conflict (Mejía 2021; Bueno 2021) Therefore, the impact that 
climate action can have on peace and security should always be considered, as well as taking into 
account the unwanted effects that peacebuilding actions can have on climate action. 
 
Pathway #2: Livelihood insecurity, illicit crops and criminal networks 
Agriculture has traditionally been a crucial sector of the economy and it currently represents 7.6% of 
the GDP. Despite the overall decrease of the relevance of the sector in the past 50 years, during the 
last decade there has been an increase in the contribution of the sector to the GDP (The World Bank 
2021). Agriculture has a great potential to continue growing and supporting food security, but it should 
effectively consider the threat posed by the climate crisis (World Bank, CIAT, and CATIE 2014). 
Projected increases in temperatures, soil erosion, desertification, and floods can adversely impact 
agriculture, resulting in declining production and productivity, increasing food insecurity particularly 
in rural areas (Ramirez-Villegas et al. 2012; Smith, Olosky, and Fernandéz 2021). Without any 
adaptation strategies, it is estimated that 60% of the cultivated land and 80% of the crops will be 
 




impacted by the changes in climate, including losses in important exports such as coffee, banana, and 
cocoa (Ramirez-Villegas et al. 2012). This is particularly worrisome for small scale agriculture because 
of its high dependency on rain-fed agriculture and its limited adapting capacity (Ramirez-Villegas et al. 
2012; The World Bank Group 2021). 
The cultivation of illicit crops such as coca and opium poppy by small scale farmers has been identified 
as an unsustainable and dangerous way to cope with food insecurity and the unpredictability of 
agricultural markets (UNODC n.d.). In some rural areas of Colombia there is a lack of the necessary 
infrastructure that can grant the access to markets for legal crops while illegal crops have fixed prices 
that are generally higher than other crops as well as access to markets granted by narcotraffickers and 
armed groups (International Crisis Group 2021). 
However, the cultivation of illicit crops has a severe impact in the Colombian economy and society as 
well as the environment. The cultivation of illicit crops is linked to high levels of violence that 
particularly affect farmers which stand between the confrontations of the different armed groups and 
are subjected to their arbitrary rule (International Crisis Group, 2021). The planting of coca is also an 
important driver of deforestation and loos of biodiversity. The increase in coca cultivation has been 
linked to the expansion of the agricultural frontier, the increase of extensive livestock production as 
well as the control of the territory by NSAGs which often run illegal mining activities that further 
contribute to deforestation (Gutiérrez, Canal, and Ávila 2018). Deforestation, in turn, increases GHG 
emissions, contributing to climate change, while also altering the solar radiation, the nutrients and the 
humidity of the soil (Palomino López et al. 2014). 
The cultivation of coca contributes to environmental degradation through the deterioration of highly 
biodiverse areas which are essential carbon sinks that play a crucial role in the fight against climate 
change. In the last two decades there has been an encroachment of coca plantations into conservation 
areas such as indigenous reserves, national parks and other types of conservation areas where around 
half of the plantations are currently located (UNODC-SIMCI 2021). The changes in land use have 
affected ecosystems in different ways, including the reduction of water resources (Quimbayo Ruiz 
2008). The chemicals used in the processing of the coca, often done in the same place as the 
cultivation, generally result in the pollution of food, land and water systems (Slunge 2015). 
The cultivation of coca and the associated deforestation reduce the resilience of socio-ecological 
systems, increasing the vulnerability to the projected increase in climate variability and extremes 
(Kendra McSweeney 2015). This is particularly worrisome when the environmental degradation and 
the loss of socio-ecological resilience -because of the strong presence of coca plantations coincides- 
coincide with the exposure to climate variability and extremes. For instance, the department of 
Putumayo, which concentrates the third largest area of coca cultivation in the country, is also exposed 
to an increasing number of landslides and floods (Murad and Pearse 2018; The World Bank Group 
2021). In these contexts, the impact of the climate crisis could exacerbate existing social-economic, 
political and environmental vulnerabilities, increasing livelihood insecurity of small-scale farmers and 
incrementing the likelihood of their engagement in criminal and narcotrafficking networks through, 
for example, the cultivation of coca or opium poppy (Nett and Rüttinger 2016). 
Following the Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP signed in 2016, 
Colombia’s Program to Substitute Crops Used for Illegal Purposes was launched in 2017 to promote 
the voluntary substitution of illicit crops through the implementation of various sustainable projects 
aimed to enhance farmers livelihood and living conditions (Presidencia de la República 2017). In this 
post-conflict scenario, Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) could play a vital role in increasing the 
productivity and food security of Colombian farmers while also mitigating and adapting to the effects 
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of the climate crisis, increasing their overall resilience and the likelihood of engagement in criminal 













4. Key Messages and Entry Points for Climate Security in LAC 
The IPA develops different specific pathways through which climate can impact socio-economic, 
political and environmental vulnerabilities and exacerbate the risks of insecurity and conflict in 
Venezuela and Colombia. Particularly, it helps to understand how the complex and multifaceted 
interconnections between climate and conflict play out in specific climate security hotspots that are 
vulnerable to both climate and conflict. By doing so it aims to inform academics, practitioners, donors, 
investors, national and international policymakers about a complicated and heterogeneous reality and 
help them to develop more tailored responses that target those regions and communities most at risk 
and in need of urgent help. However, interconnected climate, security, and migration crises are being 
managed as separate challenges in LAC. It is essential to overcome sectoral silos between the 
development, climate and peace communities, making sure that climate action is more conflict-
sensitive and that peacebuilding efforts take into account their impact on climate. Through well-
targeted support that complements humanitarian, political, social, and security-focused solutions, 
agricultural research for development can help rural populations adapt to and mitigate climate change 
impacts, stabilize agriculture-based livelihoods, and increase peace and security.  
CGIAR is uniquely positioned as a global leader in scientific research on land, water and food systems 
in a climate crisis.  Given the interlinkages of land, water and food systems with peace and security, it 
follows that CGIAR science, innovation, and technologies are critical in supporting global efforts to 
secure sustainable peace. CGIAR aims to address gaps in knowledge about climate and food security 
for peace and security policies and operations through a unique multidisciplinary approach. It´s main 
objective is to align evidence from the realms of climate, land, water and food systems science with 
peacebuilding efforts already underway in order to address conflict through evidence-based 
environmental, political, and socio-economic solutions. 
CGIAR has identified several entry points for a climate security road map in LAC, including efforts to: 
1. Foster inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral dialogue on currently siloed perspectives.  
2. Comprehensively quantify interrelated social, economic and environmental challenges and 
business cases to target public and private sector investment, including in research. 
3. Build on existing regional networks and transfer platforms to re-think and re-design 
community-based approaches that can effectively serve a range of interrelated objectives and 
provide space and freedom to act for locally led, community-based approaches and build local 
resilience. 
4. Put rural human development much higher on the agenda. 
5. Strengthen and focus agricultural research for development to transform the agricultural 
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